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Abstract: In this paper we determine the number of positive integer sequences
a1, a2, . . . , ak such that 1 ≤ a1 ≤ · · · ≤ ak ≤ m and ai ≥ i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
After that, we apply this result to calculate the number of anonymous, neutral
and monotonic social welfare functions when only two alternatives are consid-
ered.
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1. Introduction
Binomial coefficients are closely related to counting problems and they appear
in many scientific fields. As is well known, the binomial coefficient
(m
k
)
is the
number of k-element subsets of {1, . . . ,m}. When the repetition of elements is
allowed, we find the multichoose coefficient,
((m
k
))
, defined by((
m
k
))
=
(
m+ k − 1
k
)
.
An equivalent interpretation is that
((m
k
))
is the number of positive integer se-
quences a1, a2, . . . , ak such that 1 ≤ a1 ≤ · · · ≤ ak ≤ m (see, for instance,
Benjamin and Quinn [1]).
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In this paper we focus on the previous sequences whose elements satisfy
an additional condition, ai ≥ i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and we calculate their
number. Next, this number will be applied to the field of Social Choice by
determining the number of social welfare functions (SWFs) that satisfy anony-
mity, neutrality and monotonicity.
The paper is organized in two sections. The first section provides the main
result of this paper. In the second section we apply this result to Social Choice
Theory.
2. The Result
Before providing the result, we recall the definition and some properties of bi-
nomial coefficients (see, for instance, Riordan [7] and Benjamin and Quinn [1]).
Remark 1. Let m ∈ N and k ∈ Z. Then:
1.
(
m
k
)
=


m!
k!(m− k)!
, if 0 ≤ k ≤ m,
0, otherwise.
2.
(
m
k
)
=
(
m
m− k
)
.
3.
(
m
k
)
+
(
m
k + 1
)
=
(
m+ 1
k + 1
)
.
4. If k ≥ 0, then
m∑
i=k
(
i
k
)
=
(
m+ 1
k + 1
)
.
Now we determine the number of positive integer sequences a1, a2, . . . , ak
such that 1 ≤ a1 ≤ · · · ≤ ak ≤ m and ai ≥ i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. For any set
S, #S will denote the cardinal of S.
Proposition 2. Given k,m ∈ N with k ≥ 1 and m ≥ k, let smk = #S
m
k ,
where
Smk =
{
(a1, . . . , ak) ∈ N
k |
1 ≤ a1 ≤ · · · ≤ ak ≤ m,
ai ≥ i, i = 1, . . . , k
}
.
Then
smk =
(
m+ k − 1
k
)
−
(
m+ k − 1
k − 2
)
.
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Proof. The proof is by induction on k. If k = 1, then
sm1 = #{a1 ∈ N | 1 ≤ a1 ≤ m} = m
=
(
m+ 1− 1
1
)
−
(
m+ 1− 1
−1
)
,
where the last equality is due to (1) of Remark 1. Suppose now the result is
true for k = p, where p ≤ m−1, and let’s see that the claim holds for k = p+1.
Since m ≥ p + 1, smp+1 can be calculated taking into account that the largest
element of the sequence, ap+1, ranges between p+ 1 and m, that is,
Smp+1 =
{
(a1, . . . , ap+1) ∈ N
p+1 |
1 ≤ a1 ≤ · · · ≤ ap+1 ≤ m,
ai ≥ i, i = 1, . . . , p + 1
}
=
m⋃
j=p+1
{
(a1, . . . , ap, j) ∈ N
p+1 |
1 ≤ a1 ≤ · · · ≤ ap ≤ j,
ai ≥ i, i = 1, . . . , p
}
.
Therefore, taking into account (4) and (2) of Remark 1, we have
smp+1 =
m∑
j=p+1
sjp =
m∑
j=p+1
[(
j + p− 1
p
)
−
(
j + p− 1
p− 2
)]
=
m+p−1∑
i=2p
(
i
p
)
−
m+p−1∑
i=2p
(
i
p− 2
)
=

m+p−1∑
i=p
(
i
p
)
−
2p−1∑
i=p
(
i
p
)
−

m+p−1∑
i=p−2
(
i
p− 2
)
−
2p−1∑
i=p−2
(
i
p− 2
)
=
((
m+ p
p+ 1
)
−
(
2p
p+ 1
))
−
((
m+ p
p− 1
)
−
(
2p
p− 1
))
=
(
m+ p
p+ 1
)
−
(
m+ p
p− 1
)
.
3. An Application to Social Choice Theory
One of the most important issues in the field of Social Choice is the analysis of
social welfare functions (SWFs), that is, procedures for determining a collective
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preference from the opinions of a group of n individuals on a set of alternatives.
The simplest case is when only two alternatives are considered. However, this
case is not trivial and it has generated a vast literature on the subject. The aim
of this section is to determine, in this case, the number of SWFs that satisfy
the following properties: anonymity, neutrality and monotonicity. For this, we
will apply the result obtained in the previous section.
Next we introduce basic concepts and notation on SWFs. LetN = {1, . . . , n}
be the set of voters, with n ≥ 2, and x, y two alternatives. The individual pref-
erences between both alternatives are described by a profile D = (d1, . . . , dn),
where di is 1,−1 or 0 depending on whether individual i prefers x to y, y to
x or is indifferent between both alternatives. The set of profiles of preferences
will be denoted by D.
Given D,D′ ∈ D and σ a permutation of N , we will use the following
notation: n+(D) = #{i ∈ N | di = 1}, n
−(D) = #{i ∈ N | di = −1},
−D = (−d1, . . . ,−dn), Dσ = (dσ(1), . . . , dσ(n)) and D
′ ≥ D will mean d′i ≥ di
for all i ∈ N . Moreover, given a ∈ R, ⌊a⌋ will denote the integer part of a, i.e.,
the largest integer smaller than or equal to a.
For each profile of preferences, the collective preference will be obtained by
means of SWFs.
Definition 3. A SWF is a mapping F : D −→ {−1, 0, 1}.
The possible values of F , 1, 0, and −1, have a similar interpretation as that
in the case of individual preferences.
Next we present some well-known properties of SWFs: Anonymity, neu-
trality and monotonicity. The first one, anonymity, guarantees an equalitarian
treatment for all individuals. Similarly, neutrality assures that both alterna-
tives are treated equally. Finally, monotonicity means that increased support
for an alternative does not hurt this alternative.
Definition 4. Let F be a SWF.
1. F is anonymous if for all permutation σ of N and all profile D ∈ D we
have F (Dσ) = F (D).
2. F is neutral if for all profile D ∈ D we have F (−D) = −F (D).
3. F is monotonic if for all pair of profile D,D′ ∈ D such that D′ ≥ D we
have F (D′) ≥ F (D).
It is worth noting that if F is anonymous, then the value F (D) depends on
only of n+(D) and n−(D). On the other hand, any neutral SWF is characterized
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by the set F−1({1}), since
F−1({−1}) = {D ∈ D | −D ∈ F−1({1})},
F−1({0}) = D \
(
F−1({1}) ∪ F−1({−1})
)
.
It is easy to check that there exist 33
n
different SWFs. As new properties are
imposed on the SWFs, the number of them is diminished. For instance, Perry
and Powers [5, 6] have calculated the number of SWFs that satisfy anony-
mity, 3(n
2+3n+2)/2, anonymity and neutrality, 3⌊(n
2+2n+1)/4⌋, and anonymity
and monotonicity,
(2n+3
n+1
)
. On the other hand, Young et al. [8] have deter-
mined the number of SWFs that satisfy anonymity, neutrality and monotonic-
ity,
(
n+1
⌊n
2
⌋+1
)
. It is worth noting that similar counting problems have also been
considered by Freixas and Zwicker [4] and Campbell et al. [2].
In the sequel we get the same number as obtained by Young et al. [8],
although by a different approach. From a result given by Fishburn [3, p. 56],
we reduce SWFs to positive integer sequences that express the number of votes
needed for an alternative to win, according to the number of votes obtained
by the other alternative. However, Young et al. [8] specify these sequences
according to the number of tie votes. For this reason, these sequences are quite
different and the procedure for obtaining the number of anonymous, neutral
and monotonic SWFs is also completely different.
We begin with the result given by Fishburn [3, p. 56], which can be given
as a characterization of anonymous, neutral and monotonic SWFs.
Theorem 5. Let F be a SWF. Then the following statements are equiv-
alent:
1. F is anonymous, neutral and monotonic.
2. There exist integers r0 ≤ r1 ≤ · · · ≤ r⌊n−12 ⌋
that satisfy ri ≥ i for all
i ∈
{
0, 1, . . . ,
⌊
n−1
2
⌋}
and such that
F (D) =


1, if n+(D) > rn−(D),
−1, if n−(D) > rn+(D),
0, otherwise.
Let R be the set of vectors
(
r0, r1, . . . , r⌊n−12 ⌋
)
such that the integers ri
satisfy the conditions given in the previous theorem. According to this theorem,
given r ∈ R, we can associate with r an anonymous, neutral and monotonic
SWF, Fr.
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The number of anonymous, neutral and monotonic SWFs is going to be
obtained through the vectors of R. However, given that different vectors r, r′ ∈
R can generate the same SWF, we firstly need to characterize these vectors.
For this, given r ∈ R, we will use the following notation:
Nr =
{
i ∈
{
0, 1, . . . ,
⌊
n−1
2
⌋}
| i+ ri ≤ n− 1
}
.
The set Nr is closely connected with the SWF Fr, as we show in the following
lemma.
Lemma 6. Let r ∈ R. Then the following statements are equivalent:
1. i ∈ Nr.
2. There exists D ∈ D such that n−(D) = i and Fr(D) = 1.
Proof.
(1) ⇒ (2): Given i ∈ Nr, let D ∈ D a profile such that n
−(D) = i and
n+(D) = ri + 1. This profile exists because n
−(D) + n+(D) = i + ri + 1 ≤ n.
Moreover, Fr(D) = 1 since n
+(D) > rn−(D).
(2) ⇒ (1): Suppose that there exists D ∈ D such that n−(D) = i and
Fr(D) = 1. Since Fr(D) = 1, we have n
+(D) > rn−(D) = ri. Therefore,
i+ ri < n
−(D) + n+(D) ≤ n and, consequently, i ∈ Nr.
Now, we are going to characterize the vectors that generate the same SWFs.
Proposition 7. Let r, r′ ∈ R. Then the following statements are equiva-
lent:
1. Fr = Fr′ .
2. Nr = Nr′ and ri = r
′
i for all i ∈ Nr.
Proof.
(1)⇒ (2): First, we are going to prove that Nr = Nr′ . By Lemma 6, i ∈ Nr
if and only if there exists D ∈ D such that n−(D) = i and Fr(D) = 1. Since
Fr = Fr′ , then there exists D ∈ D such that n
−(D) = i and Fr′(D) = 1 and,
again by Lemma 6, this is equivalent to i ∈ Nr′ .
Now, we are going to prove that ri = r
′
i for all i ∈ Nr. This is proven by
contradiction. Suppose that there exists i ∈ Nr such that ri 6= r
′
i. We can
suppose, without loss of generality, that ri < r
′
i. Consider a profile D ∈ D such
that n−(D) = i and n+(D) = ri+1 (this profile exists because n
−(D)+n+(D) =
i + ri + 1 ≤ n). For this profile we have Fr(D) = 1 and Fr′(D) < 1; i.e., a
contradiction.
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(2)⇒ (1): Since Fr and Fr′ are neutral, it is sufficient to prove that Fr(D) =
1 if and only if Fr′(D) = 1 for all D ∈ D. Let D ∈ D such that Fr(D) = 1. By
Lemma 6, n−(D) ∈ Nr, and
Fr(D) = 1 ⇒ n
+(D) > rn−(D) ⇒ n
+(D) > r′n−(D) ⇒ Fr′(D) = 1.
In a similar way we can prove that Fr′(D) = 1 ⇒ Fr(D) = 1 for all D ∈ D.
The previous proposition allows us to determine, in a methodical way, the
SWFs that satisfy anonymity, neutrality and monotonicity. Let’s see an exam-
ple.
Example 8. Consider the case n = 3. For this value,
R = {(r0, r1) ∈ N
2 | 0 ≤ r0 ≤ r1, r1 ≥ 1},
and given r ∈ R, Nr = {i ∈ {0, 1} | ri ≤ 2− i}. Therefore:
1. If Nr = ∅, then we have the null SWF: Fr(D) = 0 for all D ∈ D.
2. If Nr = {0}, then r0 can take any value between 0 and 2. So,
(a) If r0 = 0, then we obtain Pareto majority:
Fr(D) = 1 ⇔ n
+(D) > 0 and n−(D) = 0.
(b) If r0 = 1, then we have the SWFs defined by:
Fr(D) = 1 ⇔ n
+(D) > 1 and n−(D) = 0.
(c) If r0 = 2, then we obtain unanimous majority:
Fr(D) = 1 ⇔ n
+(D) = 3.
3. If Nr = {0, 1}, then r1 = 1 and 0 ≤ r0 ≤ r1. Thus,
(a) If (r0, r1) = (0, 1), then we have simple majority:
Fr(D) = 1 ⇔ n
+(D) > n−(D).
(b) If (r0, r1) = (1, 1), then we obtain absolute majority:
Fr(D) = 1 ⇔ n
+(D) > 1.
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According to Proposition 7, the number of anonymous, neutral an mono-
tonic SWFs, Sn, can be determined through the following expression:
Sn = 1 +
⌊n+12 ⌋∑
j=1
#Nn−jj ,
where Nn−jj , j = 1, . . . ,
⌊
n+1
2
⌋
, are the sets defined by
N
n−j
j =
{
(r0, . . . , rj−1) ∈ N
j |
0 ≤ r0 ≤ · · · ≤ rj−1 ≤ n− j,
ri ≥ i, i = 0, . . . , j − 1
}
.
Consider now the function h : Nn−jj −→ S
n+1−j
j defined by
h(r0, . . . , rj−1) = (r0 + 1, . . . , rj−1 + 1).
It is easy to check that h is a biyection. Therefore, by Proposition 2, we have
#Nn−jj = #S
n+1−j
j = s
n+1−j
j =
(n
j
)
−
( n
j−2
)
.
The previous remark allows us to get the number of SWFs that satisfy
anonymity, neutrality and monotonicity.
Proposition 9. The number of anonymous, neutral and monotonic SWFs
is
(
n+ 1⌊
n+1
2
⌋).
Proof. According with (1) and (3) of Remark 1, we have:
Sn = 1 +
⌊n+1
2
⌋∑
j=1
s
n+1−j
j =
(
n
0
)
+
⌊n+1
2
⌋∑
j=1
[(
n
j
)
−
(
n
j − 2
)]
=
⌊n+12 ⌋∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
−
⌊n+12 ⌋−2∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
=
(
n⌊
n+1
2
⌋
− 1
)
+
(
n⌊
n+1
2
⌋)
=
(
n+ 1⌊
n+1
2
⌋).
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